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ian reemployment.
William "Sky" King, a member of
the Alabama National Guard, applied
655-56(citingFirstNat'IBankv. us.F. to become a Command Sergeant Ma& G. Co., 340 A.2d 275 (Md. 1975)}. jor in the Active Guard/Reserve
The court concluded that in order to ("AGR"}program. Athreeyeartourof
further the purposes inherent in puni- duty was required by army regulations
tive damages and because of their pe- of the person holding that position.
nal nature the "[u]se of a clear and Upon learning ofhis appointment, King
convincing standard of proof [would] notified his employer, St. Vincent's
help to insure that punitive damages Hospital, of his acceptance, requested
[were] properly awarded." Id. at 657. a three year leave of absence, and reIn Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, the ported for duty as ordered. Several
court of appeals clearly attempted to weeks later, St. Vincent's notified him
"fix" Maryland law regarding jury that his request was unreasonable and
awards of punitive damages. How- was therefore beyond the Act's guarever, in adjusting the scales ofjustice, antee of reemployment. St. Vincent's
the court simply tilted the scales in the then brought an action fora declaratory
opposite direction. While the elimina- judgment in the United States District
tion of the "arising out of contract" Court for the District of Northern Aladistinction was appropriate in light of bama to settle the question of whether
the arbitrariness ofthe rule, and the use the applicable terms of the Act provide
of clear and convincing evidence stan- reemployment rights after tours ofduty
dard was justified by the penal impli- as long as King's.
The district court held that service
cation of punitive damages, the court
tilted the scales in favor of the defen- in the AGR program was protected
dant when it adopted the "actual mal- under section 2024(d), but that a three
ice" standard of conduct. As a result, year leave ofabsence was per se unreaplaintiffs who clearly have been the sonable. King, 112 S. Ct. at 572. The
victims of a grossly negligent defen- court's reasoning paralleled the opindant will find little redress in the Mary- ions of the third, fifth and eleventh
circuits which had held that leave reland courts.
quests under section 2024(d} must meet
- Laurie Ann Garey a test of reasonableness. A panel ofthe
eleventh circuit affirmed the district
Kingv. St. Vincent'sHospital: MEM- court's decision. Due in part to the fact
BERS OF THE ARMED FORCES that the fourth circuit had declined to
RETAIN THE RIGHT TO CIVIL- accept a reasonableness standard, the
IAN REEMPLOYMENT UNDER Supreme Court granted certiorari to
38 U.S.C. § 2024(d} REGARDLESS resolve the conflict among the circuits.
OF THE DURATION OF ACTIVE
The Supreme Court began its analyDUTY.
sis by recognizing the importance of
Justice Souter, writing for a unani- the wording of section 2024(d), which
mous court, authored King v. St. contains no express time limitations.
Vincent'sHosp., 112 S. Ct. 570(1991}, The Court noted that the fourth circuit
which resolved the conflict surround- had found that the words appear to
ing the interpretation of 38 U.S.C. guarantee that leave and reemployment
section 2024(d}(1981 & Supp. 1992}, be "unequivocal and unqualified,"
which is known as the Veterans' whereas the eleventh circuit had acReemployment Rights Act. The Court knowledged that the subsection "does
held that section 2024(d} does not im- not address the 'reasonableness' of a
plicitly limit the length of military reservist's leave request". King, 112
service after which a member of the S. Ct. at 573 (quoting Kolkhorst v.
armed forces retains the right to civil- Tilghman, 897 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th
convincing evidence standard in civil
cases when "fraud, dishonesty, orcriminal conduct [was] imputed ...." Id. at
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Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 865
(1992»; Gulf States Paper Corp. v.
Ingraham, 811 F.2d 1464, 1468 (11th
Cir. 1987)}. St. Vincent's argued that
"leave," as used in subsection (d), applies to an "employee," implying that
the employment relationship continues during the employee's absence and
that this relationship is incompatible
with a leave as long as King's. St.
Vincent's further argued that a leave of
this duration would create a burden on
the hospital to temporarily fill King's
position for three years until he re-'
turned to resume his job.
The Court responded by first recognizing that there is a burden placed on
employers by this section, however,
the Court found that it was not "free to
tinker with the statutory scheme." King,
112 S. Ct. at 573. The Court further
stated that it could not render the statute "susceptible to interpretive choice"
no matter how great the burden. Id. In
analyzing the statutory scheme, the
Court noted that while "subsection (d)
is utterly silent about any durational
limit on the protection it provides,
other subsections of section 2024, protecting other classes of full-time service personnel, expressly limit the periods of their protection." King, 112
S.Ct. at 573-74. From this, the Court
concluded that the simplicity of subsection (d) was deliberate and intended
to provide its benefit without imposing
conditions on the length of service.
The Court also explained that it followed the "cardinal rule that a statute is
to be read as a whole," and ''the canon
that provisions for benefits to members of the Anned Services are to be
construed in the beneficiaries favor."
Id. at 574.
The Court next addressed st.
Vincent's misapplication of the principle that a statute is to be read as a
whole. Although the hospital read the
statutory scheme to show a hierarchy
ofreemployment rights, the Court held
that the differences in treatment among
the various sections of the Act do not
necessarily amount to a hierarchy. Id.
at 574. Instead, the Court stated that

the differences oftreatment should be
"respected by limiting protection where
the text contains a limit and leaving
textually unlimited protection just
where the Congress apparently chose
to leave it." Id. at 575.
This decision had immediate ramifications in Maryland because it implicitly affirmed the fourth circuit's
holding in Kolkhorst v. Tilghman, 897
F.2d 1282, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 865
(1992). In that case, the fourth circuit
held that the Baltimore City Police
Department could not limit the number
of police officers, other than new hires,
who are allowed to join active military
reserve units. In so doing, the fourth
circuit construed section 2024( d), as
the Supreme Court did in King, as
placing no limit on reservists covered
under the section.
With the decreasing need for a fully
staffed and active military in modem
political climates, this decision also
has major implications for military
policy. It ensures a fully trained and
prepared defense structure while enabling cuts in military spending. This
would increase the amount of money
which would be available to the private
sector for things such as loans for small
businesses. The burdens placed on
employers by the Act could, therefore,
be compensated by more government
spending in the private sector.

- Shawn Gritz
Presley v. Etowah County Commiss~n:
ONLY PROCEDURAL
CHANGES DIRECTLY RELATED TO VOTING AND ELECTION PROCESSES MAY OFFEND
SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT.
After consolidating two Alabama
cases, the United States Supreme Court
held that changes in an elected official's
authority did not require preclearance
under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S. C.
§ 1973c (1975). In Presley v. Etowah
County Commission, 112 S. Ct. 820
(1992), the Court ruled that such a
change must be directly related to vot-

ing and the election process in order to
come within the Act's province.
Before engaging in its analysis, the
Court ventured into the history and
pertinent parts of the Voting Rights
Act (" Act"). The Act was created to
remove race discrimination from voting. Section 5 of the Act requires that
any changes in voting procedure with
respect to "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure" must receive administrative or judicial preclearance.
The Act defines voting to include "all
action necessary to make a vote effective." For the purpose of evaluating
changes made to a covered district's
voting practices, the Act states that
such changes should be compared
against the practices that were in use in
that jurisdiction on November 1, 1964.
When the Act was created, Etowah
County in Alabama employed the
Etowah County Commission ("Etowah
Commission") to oversee the maintenance, repair, and construction of the
county roads. The county was divided
into four districts. A five-member
commission was elected at large under
a residency district system. Four members would each receive an allotment
of funds for discretionary spending on
the roads in their respective districts.
The Etowah Commission voted as a
collective body to determine the initial
allotments each of the four members
would receive. The fifth member was
the chairman who oversaw the solid
waste authority, prepared the budget,
and managed the courthouse buildings
and grounds.
In 1986, the Etowah Commission
was restructured and increased to six
members, with each member elected
by the voters in a specific district. Four
members ofthe new commission were
holdovers from the previous commission. The newly-formed fifth district,
which was designed to create a black
majority district, elected a black man,
Lawrence Presley. A black citizen had
not previously held a seat on the Etowah
Commission in the modem era. Shortly
after the new members took office, the

Etowah Commission passed the "Common Fund Resolution." This resolution effectively removed the individual
authority from the commissioners.
Instead of allocating monies to each
commissioner, road funds were to be
kept in common accounts. This allowed a simple majority, such as the
holdover members, to decide how to
spend the funds.
In the companion case from Russell
County, Alabama, the Russell County
Commission ("Russell Commission")
originally comprised three commissioners elected at large. The commissioners were responsible for the road
shops, crew, and equipment, as well as
routine road maintenance, in their respective districts. After one of the
commissioners was indicted for corruption, the Russell Commission
adopted the "Unit System" which relegated control over road construction
to a County Engineer appointed by the
Commission. The Unit System was
not submitted for preclearance under
section 5 of the Act.
The United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
issued a consent decree in 1985 which
increased the Russell Commission to
seven members and changed the election system to district-by-district voting. The Department of Justice
precleared the decree, but did not mention the Unit System, which effectively denied the commissioners control of the road funds and equipment.
Ed Mack and Nathaniel Gosha were
elected to the new seats and became the
first black commissioners in modem
times.
The appellants, Presley, Mack, and
Gosha, filed a single complaint in district court which alleged thatthe county
commissions had violated section 5 of
the Act by not obtaining preclearance
for either the Common Fund Resolution orthe Unit System. A three-judge
panel convened by the district court
found that neither the Common Fund
Resolution nor the Unit System required preclearance under the Act.
In reviewing the history of case law
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